1. Sarkaria Commission:

Much has happened in the field of union-state relations since the examination of the Administrative Reforms Commission on the administrative aspects of the Union-State Relationship (1966-67). New trends, tensions, and difficulties have emerged as a result of social, economic, and political developments over the years. Political confrontation jeopardises consensus and cooperation, which are required for the successful running of union-state relations. In this regard, the Sarkaria Commission was established in 1983 with the goal of examining the existing arrangements between the Union and the states while keeping in mind the country's social and economic changes. The commission was required to consider the value of the country's unity and integrity in advancing the welfare of the people.

The important recommendations of Sarkaria Commission are given as under:

(I) Recommendations in Administrative Sphere:

Commission held the office of the Governor indispensable. It gave following recommendations to remove the criticism against the office:

• Appointment should be in consultation with State Chief Minister.
• Normally, full 5 years term should be allowed. However removal or transfer, if necessary should also be in consultation with the CM.
• Suggested certain qualifications for the incumbent.
• The President should decide on a bill reserved for his consideration within 3 months.

According to Justice Sarkaria, the authority to issue directives is not anti-federal. Articles 256 and 257 enshrine the Union's idea of executive supremacy. Several Union laws are to be handled by states in our polity. Article 256 simply attempts to ensure that states carry them out. Article 257 intends to ensure that the Union and states use their separate executive powers in a harmonious manner, and to vest supremacy with the Union in the event of irreconcilable conflicts between the two. As a result, the Constitution chose to have Union legislation implemented by state apparatus.

The Commission did not believe that All India Services (AIS) were obsolete; rather, they are as relevant today as they were previously. No state should be able to opt out, and more AIS should be developed. The Commission backed the Union's legal right to deploy its armed forces in a state without the latter's request and to take whatever other measures are required to suppress the disturbance in the fulfilment of its duties under Article 355.

Article 356 was viewed as a draconian power by the Commission. Depending on how it is used, it can either be a safety mechanism for the system or undermine the balance between the Union and the states. To avoid the latter, it outlined the grounds for imposing Article 356. The power should be utilised sparingly after taking all conceivable steps to prevent or correct a constitutional breakdown. Only when a particular warning has been made to the state may it be used. The Inter-State Council (ISC) should be used more effectively by both the Union and the states to resolve problems and coordinate policy and action.

(II) Recommendations in Legislative Sphere:

The Commission held that in any federal system, laws of the two levels of government in their respective spheres could be incongruous. Articles 246 and 254 ensure federal supremacy in order to deal with such a circumstance. It prevents conflicts and harmonises Union and state legislation. Federal legislative supremacy is also recognised in the United States, Canada, Australia, and West Germany. According to the Commission, states have no inherent claim to residuary powers.

Residuary powers cannot be transferred to the concurrent sphere because they contain the authority to levy a residuary tax, which if transferred to the concurrent sphere would result in double taxation and federal friction. Non-tax residuary powers, on the other hand, may be transferred to the concurrent sphere.

According to the Commission, maintaining public order through the use of the Union's armed forces has always been within the Union's exclusive legislative competence. Both the ARC and the Sarkaria Commission concluded that the Union had the suo moto competence to utilise its armed police forces in aid of civil authority under Article 355. As a result, the state's powers are not limited. States have advocated for a constitutional mandate that legislators consult with them before enacting legislation in a concurrent field. The Commission agreed that states should be consulted.

Article 249 includes built-in protections to prevent its misuse. The Commission underlined that until now, the use of Article 3 has either had the assent of governments or been based on the views of a dedicated commission. Requiring state consent would render the act ineffective and would go against the objective of the Constitution's authors. Article 3 should be left unaltered. Concerning Article 368, the panel refused to accept the demand, claiming that it would stifle the process of amending the Constitution, rendering it obsolete.

(III) Recommendations in Financial Sphere:

The Sarkaria Commission requested that the Union revise duties under Articles 268 and 269 on a regular basis. The Commission believed that taxation powers should not be made concurrent. Incentivizing change is a component of cooperative federalism that also includes a component of voluntary acceptance. The Sarkaria Commission requested that the Finance Commission investigate them.

The Commission praised the Centre's efforts to consult states before finalising the Finance Commission's terms of mandate. Both the Planning Commission and the Finance Commission play important roles. Furthermore, plan transfer is governed by a predetermined formula that has been approved by the NDC. The large magnitude of finances is a natural result of states' development-related growth needs. Other transactions routed through the Finance Ministry serve a specific purpose and have less payback liability. As a result, the criticism levelled about discretionary transfers is more theoretical.

In terms of state borrowing rights, the panel advocated for flexibility by distinguishing between short-term, medium-term, and long-term loans. The Commission agreed with the Centre's argument that the external assistance it received was channelled to states as part of its integrated resource management. Natural disasters, according to the commission, should be viewed as a national concern, with states bearing a large share of the total relief spending burden. Union should only assist the efforts of the state.

2. Punchhi Commission Report:

In 2007, under the chairmanship of Justice MM Punchhi, a commission was set-up to review Centre-state relations. The Punchhi Commission gave detailed recommendations to improve Centre-state relations. Some of the important recommendations are as follows:

• The commission has proposed 'localising emergency provisions' under Articles 355 and 356, contending that localised areas (either a district or parts of a district) -be brought under Governor's rule instead of the whole state. Such an emergency provision should however not to be of duration more than 3 months.
• To make an amendment in the Communal Violence Bill to allow deployment of Central forces without the state's consent for a short period. It has proposed that state consent should not become a hurdle in deployment of central forces in a communal conflagration. However, such deployment should only be for a week and post-facto consent should be taken from the state.
• Among the significant suggestions made by the commission is, laying down of clear guidelines for the appointment of Chief Ministers.
• The order of precedence that ought to be followed by the governor in case of a hung house:

• Call the group with the largest pre poll alliance commanding the largest number to form the government.
• The single largest party staking a claim to form the government with the support of others.
• The post-electoral coalition with all partners joining the government.
• The post electoral alliance with some parties joining the government and the remaining including independents supporting the government from outside.

• The panel also feels that governors should have the right to sanction prosecution of a minister acting against the advice of the council of ministers. However, the convention of making them chancellors of universities should be done away with.
• As for qualifications for a Governor, the Punchhi Commission suggests that the nominee should not have participated in active politics at even local level for at least a couple of years before his appointment. It also agrees with the Sarkaria recommendation that a Governor be an eminent person and does not belong to the state where he is to be posted.
• The commission also criticised arbitrary dismissal of governors, saying, "the practice of treating Governors as political football must stop".

• There should be critical changes in the role of the Governor-including fixed 5 year tenure as well as their removal only through impeachment by the State Assembly. It has also recommended that the State Chief Minister should have a say in the appointment of Governor.
• Underlining that removal of a Governor for a reason related to his discharge of functions, it has proposed provisions for impeachment by the State Legislature along the same lines as that of President by Parliament. This, significantly, goes against the doctrine of pleasure upheld by the recent Supreme Court Judgement.
• Endorsing an NCRWC recommendation, it says appointment of Governor should be entrusted to a committee comprising the Prime Minister, Home Minister, Speaker of the Lok Sabha and Chief Minister of the concerned state. The Vice-President can also be involved in the process.
• The Punchhi Commission report recommends that a constitutional amendment be brought about to limit the scope of discretionary powers ofthe Governor under Article 163 (2). Governors should not sit on decisions and must decide matterswithin a 4 month period.